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Abstract
The nonexistence of equilibria in models of electoral competition involving multiple
issues is one of the more puzzling results in political economics. In this paper, we relax
the standard assumption that parties act as expected utility maximizers. We show
that equilibria often exist when parties with limited knowledge about the electorate
are modeled as uncertainty-averse. What is more, these equilibria can be characterized
as a straightforward generalization of the classical median voter result.
Keywords: Uncertainty Aversion, Multiple Priors, Median Voter, Electoral Com-
petition over many Issues. JEL Classication Numbers: D72, D81.
1 Introduction
The present paper introduces two interlaced modeling innovations into an otherwise standard
model of Downsian electoral competition with a multidimensional policy space. It is, rst
of all, assumed that electoral outcomes for dierent constellations of party platforms are
subjectively uncertain in the sense that there is no function that maps every constellation
of party platforms to objectively known probability distributions over the vote shares for
the two parties. Secondly, it is assumed that parties have uncertainty-averse preferences.
In justication of the rst assumption, observe that real parties do indeed face choices with
uncertain consequences. Electoral outcomes are generally hard to predict as elections are
I would like to thank Jean-Pierre Benoit, Christoph Engel, Alrejandro Jofre, Philip Leifeld, Debraj Ray,
Ronny Razin, Ennio Stacchetti, Raquel Fernandez, Alessandro Lizzeri, Philipp Weinschenk and the seminar
participants at Columbia University, NYU, the CERMSEM Paris and the Chilean Central Bank. I gratefully
acknowledge the hospitality of the Centro de Modelacion Matematica of la Universidad de Chile. My biggest
thanks goes out to Efe Ok, my advisor, who tirelessly discussed all the new developments of this work with
me.
ybade@coll.mpg.de
1usually held in ever-changing environments involving new issues, turnover of party elites, and
an evolving composition of the electorate. Taking the 2008 US presidential election as an
example, observe that neither the experience with past elections nor any amount of polling
would have been sucient to determine objective winning probabilities for Barack Obama
and John McCain for all possible combinations of platforms, given that they where dealing
with some new issues (how to respond to the Lehmann brothers bankruptcy?), a new party
elite (Barack Obama was the rst African American to be nominated for President by a
major political party) and a large share of rst-time voters.
The second, related, assumption is that parties are uncertainty-averse, in the sense that
all else being equal, parties prefer situations in which they know more about the probability
distributions over the vote shares to situations in which there is less clarity about these
distributions. Such a bias against uncertainty is evidenced in the famous Ellsberg paradox
in which subjects can choose to bet on red or black in either an urn with 5 red and 5 black
balls or an urn with a total of 10 red and black balls in unknown proportion. Subjects
are generally indierent between betting on either color for a xed urn. They do, however,
prefer betting on the urn with the known proportion to betting on the other urn. This
behavior violates expected utility theory since expected utility-maximizing subjects would
have to calculate their preferences according to a xed probability for red being drawn from
the second urn, which has to be either above, below or equal to 1=2. Since such a preference
for options involving less uncertainty manifests itself in many experiments (see Camerer and
Weber (1992) for a review), we might also expect that the decision makers in parties have
uncertainty-averse preferences.
The median voter theorem states that in a game of electoral competition with a uni-
dimensional policy space played by two oce motivated parties and a set of voters with
single-peaked preferences, both parties will announce the median ideal point in equilibrium
(Black 1948, Downs 1957 and Hotelling 1929). The assumption that the policy space is
unidimensional is crucial. If one allows for a multidimensional policy space, in a classical
Downsian model pure strategy equilibria only exist under very restrictive conditions on the
distribution of voter preferences. (Plott (1967), Davis, Hinich and de Groot (1972), Grand-
mont (1978), McKelvey (1979) all show that a Condorcet winner only exists for very special
distributions of voter preferences.) This is problematic since actual electoral campaigns usu-
ally concern various dierent issues and the assumption that all these issues can be aligned
perfectly into a unidimensional policy space (say, left to right) is quite strong. Ordeshook
(1986) suggests in his discussion of multidimensional games of electoral competition (in his
book \Game Theory and Political Theory") that a more realistic modeling approach to the
uncertainties of politics might mitigate the problems of equilibrium non-existence. He says
that, \We should keep in mind, of course, that our examples do not match reality. Candi-
2dates are uncertain about voters' exact preferences, and voters are only imperfectly informed
about candidates' strategies..."
The main results of the present paper validate this claim by Ordeshook: the exis-
tence of uncertainty about voters' preferences, together with the assumption that parties
are uncertainty-averse, signicantly alleviates the problem of equilibrium non-existence in
Downsian models with multidimensional policy spaces. It has to be said, though, that the
sucient conditions for equilibrium existence only carry an intuitive interpretation for pol-
icy spaces with at most three dimensions. Still, in terms of empirical applicability, this is
a major step forward, given that a diverse set of empirical studies nds that actual policy
spaces are often of low dimensionality.1 In addition to the results on equilibrium existence,
the political equilibria in the present model are characterized through a simple extension of
the equilibrium prediction of the classic Downsian model to the environment with multiple
issues. Thanks to a separability assumption of voter preferences, parties behave as if they
were playing separate games of standard Downsian electoral competition in every dimension
of the policy space. In equilibrium they do announce the ideal point of some relevant median
voters with respect to every dimension.
The driving intuition behind the result of equilibrium existence is that the game of
electoral competition played by the parties resembles the Ellsberg paradox in the sense
that parties can set their platforms such as to choose between an objective lottery or a
subjectively uncertain distribution of vote shares. For a xed platform of the opponent,
a party can eliminate the relevance of all uncertainty on voter preferences over policies by
simply announcing the platform of the opponent. Formally, the party generates a situation
similar to the urn with the known proportion of balls. Alternatively, the party can announce a
platform that diers from the platform of the opponent. In this case, the parties' uncertainty
on voter preferences over policies matters for the determination of vote shares for the two
parties. Formally, this situation resembles the Ellsberg urn. Consequently the assumption
of uncertainty aversion introduces a bias towards adopting the platform of the opponent. If
this bias is strong enough to outweigh the desire to deviate from the platform of the other
party, equilibrium existence is obtained.
1The long-term analysis by Poole and Rosenthals long-term analysis of roll call votes nds that a policy
space of low dimensionality accurately describes the voting patterns in the US congress (Poole and Rosenthal
1997 and 2007). Hix, Noury, and Roland (2006) apply the same technique to voting in the European
Parliament and obtain the same nding: very few dimensions suce to explain voting patterns of European
parliamentarians. Party manifestos provide a dierent source of information on the issue space. Using data
from the Comparative Manifesto Project, Hix (1999) nds two salient policy dimensions for European politics
from 1976 until 1994. As an alternative approach to the one of the Comparative Manifesto Project, Laver
and Garry (2000) and Laver et al. (2003) use a fully automated method to extract meaning from political
texts, to locate the positions of parties. They content themselves with two dimensions each to describe the
policy spaces of England, Ireland, and Germany.
3There is a range of dierent proposals on how to represent the preferences of uncertainty-
averse agents, notably Bewley (2002), Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989), Schmeidler (1989),
Ghirardato et al. (2003) and Maccheroni et al. (2006). Since the main intuition for the
existence result presented in this article is rooted in the Ellsberg paradox, and since all of
these approaches are able to explain the Ellsberg paradox, the main arguments of this paper
could be based on any of these approaches. Gilboa and Schmeidler's (1989) approach was
chosen, since their model allows for tractable results and since it has already found some
application outside decision theory.2 In political economy, Ghirardato and Katz (2002) use
uncertainty aversion to explain the empirical puzzle that voters abstain from elections, even
when voting is costless, i.e., when the voter is already in the booth because of a dierent
election. Ashworth (2007) uses a similar framework to explain parties' decisions to target
some groups of voters to aect turnout and to target other groups to switch their allegiance.
Berliant and Konishi's (2005) explanation of the fact that parties avoid discussing some issues
in electoral campaigns is most related to the present paper, as the driving force behind their
argument is the assumption that parties are uncertainty-averse.
The assumption that parties are uncertain about electoral outcomes is not new to the
literature on electoral competition; models of probabilistic voting do share this assumption
with the model of the current paper.3 The present model and models of probabilistic voting
also share some results: according to both approaches Downsian games of electoral compe-
tition with multidimensional policy spaces have equilibria, if the parties' uncertainty about
voter behavior satises certain assumptions. The two approaches also share the result that
both parties announce the same platform in equilibrium. Their assumptions dier insofar
as parties are assumed to hold a prior on the behavior of the electorate in models of prob-
abilistic voting, whereas parties in the present model are assumed to be uncertainty-averse.
Another major dierence lies in the fact that the present model derives the parties' uncer-
tainty about their vote shares from an uncertainty about a primitive of the model, namely
the voters' preferences over the policy space as expressed by their ideal points and marginal
rates of substitution between the various issues.4 Conversely, models of probabilistic voting
assume an exogenous source of uncertainly about voter behavior. The models also dier
with respect to the location of the equilibrium platform. While the equilibrium platforms
in models of probabilistic voting models are calculated as weighted means of the voter ideal
points, parties in the present paper announce a median ideal point policy with respect to
every dimension of the policy space in equilibrium. In Section 3, the two models will be
compared in some more detail.
2For a survey of applications of the decision theory of uncertainty aversion to various contexts of economics
see Mukerji and Tallon (2004).
3For reviews of the literature on probabilistic voting, see Coughlin (1992) or Banks and Duggan (2006).
4In the literature on probabilistic voting, these models are sometimes called \random utility models".
4Other proposals to remedy the problem of equilibrium non-existence in platform posi-
tioning games with multidimensional issue spaces include Besley and Coate (1997), Roemer
(1999), and Duggan and Jackson (2006). In Besley and Coate's (1997) citizen candidate
model, we are faced with the problem that equilibrium sets are potentially very large. The
key to equilibrium existence in Roemer (1999) is the assumption that parties have incom-
plete preferences. In his model, any party consists of three factions called the opportunists,
militants and reformists. Parties only deviate from their platform if all three factions unan-
imously agree that such a deviation implies an improvement for the party. In the context
of the present model, an equilibrium would be trivially obtained if each party announced
the ideal point of its militant faction, as this faction would veto any deviation from this
platform. Roemer avoids such trivial conclusions by imposing some additional assumptions
on party preferences that are very reasonable in the context of progressive taxation, the
subject of his study. In the very general context of the present study, it would be dicult
to identify such additional assumptions. It should be said, however, that our assumption on
party preferences could be derived from a similar setup as Roemer's (1999) if one were to
attribute the dierent priors in the utility function of a party to dierent factions within the
party.5 Finally, Duggan and Jackson (2006) show that Simon and Zame's (1990) result on
endogenous sharing rules can be applied to the case of platform positioning in multidimen-
sional issue spaces. Duggan and Jackson show that mixed strategy equilibria exist in the
Downsian model with multiple issues if voters are not assumed to randomize exogenously
between two candidates when they are indierent.
2 Electoral Competition
We model electoral competition as a two-stage game played by two political parties, denoted
by 1 and 2, and a set of voters.6 First, the two parties simultaneously choose their platforms
within some (non-empty) convex policy space X  Rd; d  1. The separate dimensions
of the policy space are called issues. Then the voters, whose preferences are dened over
X; cast their votes. We assume throughout that parties credibly commit to their proposed
policies and that voters only care about policies. In particular, no voter has any ideological
5Levy (2004) also assumes that parties will only change platforms if the various factions in a party can
agree on such a move. Keller, Sarin, and Sounderpandian (2002) provide some empirical evidence that
groups act more uncertainty-aversely than individuals, which might be derived from a decision procedure
that groups only change their strategies if such a change is judged advantageous from the vantage point of
dierent factions who hold dierent beliefs about the stochastic environment.
6At this moment, I do not specify anything about the size of the electorate, as it is, on the one hand,
easier to state introductory examples on the theory with nite electorates and, on the other hand, easier to
state and prove theorems for the case of a continuum of voters.
5attachment or bias towards either party.
2.1 Voters
Throughout this paper, we assume that each voter's preferences can be represented by a





gi(jxi   aij) for all x 2 X
where a 2 X, gi : R+! R+ is a strictly increasing continuous function for all 1  i  d,
and g := (g1;:::;gd): We normalize gi(0) = 0 for all i: Since ug(x;a) is maximized at x = a;
we call the vector a 2 X the voter's ideal point. Observe that the functions ug((;x i);a)
are single-peaked for any x i 2 X i: In fact, any preference relation that can be represented
by a function ug(;a) that is single-peaked according to the most common notions of single-
peaked ness for multidimensional issue spaces which require that utility monotonically falls
on every arrow that points away from the ideal point of the voter (cf. Barbera, Gul, and
Stachetti (1993) and Roemer (2001)). Since the vector g determines the form of a voter's
indierence curves, we refer to it as the shape of the voter's indierence curves and we call
the function gi the attitude of a voter towards issue i: Geometrically, the indierence curves
of two voters with the same shape are translations of each other.
Observe that the model in which a voter's utility of a policy is a negative transformation
of the Euclidean distance between his ideal point and that policy is a special case, of the
present model. To obtain this special case we need to set gi(t) := t2 for all t 2 R+ and
1  i  d; we denote this shape by g: The shape g for which gi(t) := it for some i > 0
for all 1  i  d will play a major role in this paper. We denote such a shape by the
vector  := (1;:::;d). The indierence curves that correspond to utility function u(;a)
are diamond-shaped. Notably, for such a voter the marginal rate of substitution between all
issues is constant.
Insert Figure 1
Formally speaking, a voter in the present setup is characterized by a pair
(a;g) 2 X  H;




d) and each g
j
i
being some strictly increasing continuous map on R+. Consequently, the entire electorate
6can be described by a distribution of voters (a;g), which is modeled as a Borel probability
measure on X  H: Thus, if we denote the set of all Borel probability measures on a metric
space Y by P(Y ); then the space of all possible electorates in this model is P(X  H): For
any   2 P(X  H); we dene the distribution of voter ideal points  a 2 P(X) and the
distribution of shapes  g 2 P(H) as the marginal distributions of a and g, respectively.
That is,
 a(A) :=  (A  H) and  g(K) :=  (X  K);
for any Borel sets A in X and K in H.
The expression  (x;y) denotes the share of voters that will vote for platform x given
that the other platform is y and given that the electorate is described by  . We assume that
that this share  (x;y) can be calculated as the total mass of all voters who strictly prefer
x to y plus half the mass of all indierent voters. More formally, we can express the vote
share-function   : X  X ! [0;1] by









I(x;y) := f(a;g) 2 X  H : u
g(x;a) = u
g(y;a)g
for any (x;y) 2 X X; the sets of voters that strictly prefer x to y and the set of indierent
voters, respectively. The vote share function   is well dened, since both T and I are
measurable. The following example provides a concrete illustration of the model presented
so far.
Example 1: Consider a world in which there are 5 voters and 2 issues. The policy
space X equals [0;1]2: There are two voters with ideal point (1
2; 1
2) and shape : = (1;1):
There is one voter with ideal point (0;0) and circular indierence curves, two other vot-
ers with the same ideal point (2
3; 1
3) but dierent shapes, one has shape  and the other
has circular indierence curves. This electorate is formally described by the distribution
  2 P([0;1]2  fg;g) with  (f((1
2; 1
2);)g) = 2






5: Now suppose the two parties propose the platforms x = (0; 1
3) and
y = (5
6;0), respectively. In this case, we have that  (x;y) =  ((1
2; 1
2);)+  ((0;0);g) = 3
5:
Insert Figure 2





3);g) through their preferred platform (5
6;0): The dashed arc represents the indierence
curve of a voter ((0;0);g) through his preferred platform (0; 1
3): The remaining (bold) lines
all belong to the indierence curve of voter ((1
2; 1
2);) through his preferred platform: (0; 1
3):
72.2 Parties
The goal of each party is to maximize its vote share.7 A party's strategy variable is its
platform, and hence X is its strategy space. If the electorate were known, the objective of a
party would simply be to maximize  (x;y): Parties in our model, however, do not know the
electorate; they are instead uncertain about voters' preferences. The innovation of this paper
is to study such an environment under the hypothesis that parties are uncertainty-averse.
In particular, following Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) we assume that party preferences
can be represented with Maxmin expected utilities. The preferences of party i can be repre-






where Pi  P(P(X H)) is a non-empty, convex and compact set of priors on the electorate
  and where x denotes the platform of Party 1 and y the other party's platform (exchanging
the names, we obtain Party 2's preferences). Note that in this model the set of all electorates
P(X H) represents the set of all possible states. Keeping the platform of Party 2 xed at
some y 2 X, Party 1 can choose any platform x in X: Each of these platforms x corresponds
to an act fx assigning to every state   a consequence  (x;y): Formally the assumption that
parties are vote share maximizers translates to the assumption that Party 1 derives utility
 (x;y) from the consequence  (x;y); so the function   7!  (x;y) represents the utility
of Party 1 in each state. A generic element of the set P(P
(X H)) is viewed as a belief (or
prior) on the electorate; it is a probability measure on the set of all electorates (or states)
P(X  H): The case of expected vote share maximizing parties is embedded for the set of
party beliefs being a singleton.
Schmeidler's (1989) denition of uncertainty aversion requires that an agent who is indif-
ferent between two acts (weakly) prefers a mixture of these two acts to either one of them.
In terms of the game of electoral competition the concept of uncertainty aversion can be
expressed as follows. Suppose in some election Party 2 runs on platform y and Party 1 is
indierent between opposing y with platform x or platform x0. Now let that party go through
a thought experiment in which the party imagines that same identical election twice. In each
of these identical elections, Party 2 runs on platform y: Then, by the uncertainty aversion
axiom of Schmeidler, Party 1 must like to oer x in one of the elections and x0 in the other
at least as much as oering x in both elections. In short, we assume that if a party had a
7This assumption on the preferences of parties is standard, but not without criticism. The other most
common assumption on party preferences is that they maximize their probability of winning. The true goal
of a party is likely a convex combination of these two. We chose the assumption of vote share maximization
since it allows for some neat simplications of the parties' objective functions.
8chance to hedge its bets, it would not reject this chance.
2.3 The Game
The game with the two parties as players, X as each party's strategy space and Pi : XX !
R as the payo function of parties i = 1;2 is called a game of electoral competition. A (pure)
strategy prole (x;y) is called a political equilibrium if it constitutes a Nash equilibrium
in the game of electoral competition.8
We provide an example of a game of electoral competition that does not have an equi-
librium when one assumes that parties are expected utility maximizers. We show that
when one assumes that parties are suciently uncertain about the electorate and suciently
uncertainty-averse, this same game does have a political equilibrium.
Example 2: Consider the game of electoral competition with 3 voters, and a 2 dimen-
sional issue space X = [ 1;1]2. Assume that there are two states of the world,  1 and  2.
Assume that, independently of the state, all voters have Euclidean preferences and voters
1 and 2 have their ideal points at ( 1; 1) and (1;1), respectively. Assume, furthermore,
that voter 3's ideal point depends on the state of the world. In state 1, it is ( 1;1); in
the alternative state, it is (1; 1). Now let both parties be expected utility maximizers and
assume that they believe that state 1 obtains with a probability of 5
8. To see that this game
has no equilibrium, suppose the platform prole (x;y) does constitute a political equilibrium.
Observe that in equilibrium each party has to get an expected vote share of 1
2. Next, observe
that for any platform of Party 2, and therefore also for platform y, there exists a platform
x0, for Party 1 such that Party 1 obtains at least two votes in state 1. Since the preferences
of voters 1 and 2 are not state-dependent, this means also that Party 1 obtains at least one
vote in state 2 given the platform prole (x0;y). Combining these two observations with
the modeling assumption that parties agree that state 1 happens with probability 5
8, we can





2. No political equilibrium exists.
Now consider the case that parties are uncertainty-averse and that their preferences can be
represented following Gilboa and Schmeidler. Assume that both parties base the calculation
of their maxmin expected vote shares on a set of priors [4
9; 2
3] which is to be interpreted as
the set of probabilities that state 1 obtains (p( 1 2 [4
9; 2
3])). Consider the strategy prole
8Since the interpretation of mixed strategies poses a challenge in the context of games of electoral com-
petition, we do not examine mixed strategy equilibria in the present paper. In addition it has to be said
that the extension of the present model to one in which parties are allowed to mix is non-trivial: one would
have to make some well-founded choices on the interaction between the endogenous uncertainty (mixtures
of parties) and the exogenous uncertainty about the voters' preferences.
9according to which both parties oer the platform (0;0). Observe that, for any deviation
from this platform prole, the deviator party obtains at most two votes in one of the two
states and one vote for the other state. A party that ponders a deviation that yields more
votes in  1 uses p( 1) = 4





2. Conversely, if the deviation under consideration yields more votes in  2




2. In sum, there are no
protable deviations from ((0;0)(0;0)); the prole is a political equilibrium.
It is important to note that it is conceptually impossible to consider the \same model"
with and without uncertainty aversion. In the example, parties were once modeled as ex-
pected utility maximizers with a prior of 5
8 and once as maxmin expected utility maximizers
with a set of priors [4
9; 2
3]. However, nothing forces us to assume this particular prior and
this particular set of priors. If the expected utility maximizing parties had a single prior p
with p( 1) = 1
2, the prole ((0;0);(0;0)) would also be an equilibrium for expected utility
maximizing parties. Conversely if the uncertainty-averse parties had a set of priors [1
8; 1
4], no
political equilibrium would exist even for the uncertainty-averse parties. It is important to
note, though, that the case in which an equilibrium exists for expected utility-maximizing
parties is a knife-edge case: an equilibrium exists if and only if p( 1) = 1
2. Conversely, the set
of sets of beliefs for which an equilibrium exists is a large one, namely a political equilibrium
exists for all intervals [a;b] with a  1
2  b.
Consequently, the claim made by the present paper is not that uncertainty aversion
suces to obtain equilibrium existence in games of electoral competition. Rather, the main
claim is that while the conditions under which equilibria exist in multidimensional games of
electoral competition with expected vote share maximizing parties are knife-edge conditions,
the conditions for equilibrium existence for the case of uncertainty-averse parties are rather
generic - at least as long as one considers only two- to three-dimensional policy spaces.
3 Large Electorates
While it is easier to state concrete examples in terms of nite electorates, as was done
above, the derivation of general results turns out to be easier when assuming non-atomic
distributions of voter ideal points, since in this case medians of distributions of most preferred
policies with respect to single issues are unique. We therefore impose from now on that
parties believe that the voter ideal point distribution is non-atomic and has full support.
Formally, we assume that for any   2supp(p) for some p 2 P, the distribution of voter ideal
points  a is non-atomic and supp( a) = X. We write the set of all Borel measures fullling
these additional assumptions as P(X  H): In the context of large electorates, this seems
to be a reasonable simplication.
10It turns out that it is equivalent to think of the decision problem of parties in terms
of expected vote shares or in terms of vote shares according to the expected electorate.
To this end, the set of expected voter distributions for a set of beliefs on the electorate
P 2 P(P
(X  H)) is dened as 	 := f
R
P(XH)  p(d ) : p 2 Pg.
Proposition 1: For any non-empty, convex and compact subset P of P(P
(X H)); the
set 	 := f
R
P(XH)  p(d ) : p 2 Pg is a convex subset of P(X  H); and
P(x;y) = min
 2	
 (x;y) for all (x;y) 2 X
2:
Proof: See Appendix. 
Proposition 1 shows that it is without loss of generality to represent the preferences of




where 	 is some non-empty convex subset of P(X  H): Moreover, it will simplify things
greatly to view 	 as the primitive of the model and to introduce our further assumptions on
party beliefs, as assumptions on this set.
Remark:. Expected vote share maximizing parties arise as a special case of multiple-prior
formulation of party preferences. If the set of priors P is a singleton, say fpg, the objective







Following Proposition 1, this is exactly the vote share of Party 1 when the platform prole
is (x;y) and the expected electorate   :=
R
P(XH)  p(d ): That is,
fpg(x;y) =  (x;y)
where  (S) :=
R
P(XH)  (S)p(d ) for all Borel subsets S of XH: Therefore, models with
parties that are certain about the electorate and models with expected vote share maximizing
parties are formally equivalent. Consequently, there is no hope to solve the well-known
nonexistence problems of the standard electoral competition models with multidimensional
issue spaces by just introducing risk (or Savagean uncertainty) into these models. In other
words, this is a formal statement and proof of Banks and Duggan's (2006) assertion of a \folk
theorem" on probabilistic voting which is that the \Random Utility Model" (deriving party
11uncertainty on vote shares from their uncertainty about voter types) is formally equivalent to
the model of electoral competition with parties that know the voter distribution.9 To obtain
equilibrium existence probabilistic voting models have to assume that the uncertainty about
vote shares derives from an exogenous source, not from uncertainty about aspects of voter
preferences.
To save on notation, we let 	1 = 	2 = 	: This assumption is not needed for any of the
results in the paper: all results hold if the conditions on 	 are instead applied to each of the
set of beliefs 	1;	2. The set 	 not only reects the parties' beliefs about the electorate but it
also reects their uncertainty aversion. Therefore it is not appropriate to invoke the common
prior assumption as a justication of the assumption that 	1 = 	2 = 	. Two actors that
have access to the same amount of information might base their decisions on dierent sets
of priors, simply because actors' attitudes towards uncertainty might dier. There are some
decision-theoretic models that distinguish between the uncertainty of the decision maker
and his attitude towards that uncertainty; see, for instance, Ghiradato (2004) and Klibano,
Marinacci, and Mukerji (2005). Additional comments on the common prior assumption can
be found in Remark (d) in Section 4.1.
We need further assumptions on the nature of the set 	 of parties' beliefs to establish
our main results. To this end, we dene the set 	(;G) as the set of beliefs on the electorate
that has been generated by the set  of voter ideal point distributions and by the set G of
shapes as follows:
	(;G) := f  2 P
(X  H) :  a 2  and supp( g)  Gg:
This denition says that for any electorate in 	(;G); the voter ideal point distribution
belongs to  and the shape of the indierence curves of any voter belongs to set G: Our
assumption states that party beliefs about the electorate can be generated from a set of beliefs
on the voter ideal point distribution and some sets of attitudes towards all the dierent issues.
(A1) There exists a non-empty, convex set   P(X) and non-empty, nite sets Gi of
strictly increasing and continuous maps on R+ such that 	 = 	(;G1      Gd):
(A1) excludes the case that certain attitudes about issues say g0
1 only arise in combination
with certain other attitudes about other issues, say g0
2 or g00
2: In contrast, if according to some
9Duggan (2007) notes in a somewhat dierent context that \the probabilistic voting model [in which par-
ties share a prior about the distribution of voter preferences], once majority preferences have been generated,
is formally a special case of the general continuum model" in which parties maximize expected vote shares
given a known electorate. I chose to provide my own proof of Proposition 1, since Banks and Duggan (2006)
do not formally state and prove the claimed \folk theorem", and since Duggan's (2007) proof concerns a
slightly dierent context.
12belief the indierence curves of some voters have the shape (g1;g2) (over a two-dimensional
issue space) while others have the shape (g0
1;g0
2); then there must be an alternative belief in
the set 	 according to which some voters have indierence curves with shape (g0
1;g2): (A1)
also excludes the case that parties associate certain sets of ideal points with a particular type
of indierence-curve shape. (A1) requires that if for some   2 	 the parties believe that all
voters with ideal points in some set A  X have the shape g; then there must be a  0 2 	
such that parties believe that all voters with ideal point not in A have that shape g:
The standard case of an electorate where all voters are assumed to have Euclidean pref-
erences fulls (A1), as can be seen by letting Gi consist only of the map t 7! t2 for all i: The
belief set of parties that are maximally uncertain about the electorate also satises (A1) as
we have that P(X  H) = 	(P(X);H): More importantly, given (A1), we can control the
amount of uncertainty in the model, by varying the sizes of  and G. For instance, take
a set of belief sets 	 := 	(;G) for a sequence of sets (;G)2N: Let   +1 and
G  G+1 for all  2 N, which of course implies that 	  	+1 for all  2 N . Then
the uncertainty of parties decreases as  becomes larger. Consequently, the degree of uncer-
tainty can be varied continuously within the model. Electorates in which all voters have the
same shape of indierence curves g =  play a major role in the proofs of this paper. Such
an electorate is denoted by    with the understanding that  is the voter ideal point
distribution and  the (diamond-)shape of all voter's indierence curves.
Under Assumption (A1), all the information that denes a game of electoral competition
is summarized by the quadruple (d;X;;G). Both players share the d dimensional policy
space X as their action space. The players' payo functions are derived from the set of beliefs




 (x;y) and min
2	(;G)
(1    (x;y)) for all (x;y) 2 X
2:
Since the quadruple (d;X;;G) uniquely denes a game of electoral competition, it is
convenient to call this quadruple itself the game of electoral competition.
We conclude this section with a Lemma about two preliminary observations on games of
electoral competition. The rst one is that in any political equilibrium, both parties have
to get exactly half the vote share according to all beliefs on the electorate. The second is
that an increase in the amount of uncertainty and uncertainty aversion in a game of electoral
competition, as reected by the increase of the sets  and G, weakly increases the set of
equilibria.
Lemma 1. Let (d;X;;G) and (d;X;0;G0) be two games of electoral competition with
  0 and G  G0 and let (x;y) be political equilibrium of the former game. Then  (x;y) =
1
2 for all   2 	(;G) and (x;y) is also an equilibrium of the latter game.
13Proof: Let (x;y) be an equilibrium in (d;X;;G). Suppose we had that  0(x;y) < 1
2
for some  0 2 	(;G). Then min 2	(;G)  (x;y) < 1
2 and Party 1 would be better o to
oer y as  (y;y) = 1
2 for all   2 	(;G) and therefore min 2	(;G)  (y;y) = 1
2. If, on
the other hand,  0(x;y) > 1
2 for some  0 2 	(;G), then Party 2 would like to oer x by
the same reasoning. To see that (x;y) is also an equilibrium of the latter game, observe
that neither player has a protable deviation from (x;y) as min 2	(;G)  (x;y) = 1
2 
min 2	(;G)  (x;y)  min 2	(0;G0)  (x;y) where the rst inequality follows from (x;y)
being an equilibrium in the former game and the second following from 0 and G0 being
supersets of  and G. 
4 Uncertainty about Marginal Rates of Substitution
The voters' marginal rates of substitution between issues are determined by the shapes of
their indierence curves g. Consequently, the parties' uncertainty about the voters' rates
of substitution between the issues can be expressed as uncertainty about the shapes of
indierence curves. Information about all voters' patterns of marginal rates of substitution
between issues is probably even harder to obtain than information about their ideal points;
we therefore start out by analyzing games of electoral competition when parties are only
uncertain about rates of substitution and show that any game of electoral competition with
two issues has a political equilibrium if parties are uncertain as to whether the voters'
marginal rates of substitution between these two issues is more or less than some xed rate.
This includes games with known distributions of voter ideal points. So we can say that for
games of electoral competition with only two issues, one kind of uncertainty is sucient for
the existence of political equilibria. Such equilibria exist even if parties are only uncertain
about the voters' marginal rates of substitution. The following denition of uncertainty
about the marginal rates of substitution comprises the case of n issues.
Denition: A party is (strictly) uncertain about the marginal rates of substi-
tution if there exists an  2 Rd
++ such that in all Gi there are some dierentiable functions
hi and ki with h0
i(t)  i  k0
i(t) for all t 2 R+ (or, in the case of strict uncertainty,
h0
i(t) > i > k0
i(t)).
To illustrate this condition, x a platform x and consider a voter with ideal point a. A
party that is uncertain about the marginal rates of substitution does not know that voter's
indierence curve through platform x. It does, however, have a xed rate of substitution
1
2
in mind and always takes the cases that the rate of substitution is larger or smaller than this
rate into account. Formally, the assumption that parties are uncertain about the shapes of
voter indierence curves g is equivalent to the assumption that voters have thick indierence
14curves and each party assumes that all indierent voters and all voters with a strict preference
for the other party will vote for the other party. In terms of these thick indierence curves,
the assumption that parties are (strictly) uncertain about the marginal rates of substitution
arises if there exists a shape  such that every one of these thick indierence curves contains
the indierence curve of that shape .
This denition is not vacuous. If all voters have Euclidean preferences, the condition
is, for example, not fullled. Observe, on the other hand, that parties need not be very
uncertain for this condition to be fullled. Indierence curves do not have to be very thick
to contain the indierence curves of shape . Parties might, for example, know that the
marginal rate of substitution between issues i and j lies in a small interval around
i
j:
In fact, the extreme case that parties know that all voters' indierence curves have the
same shape  is also covered by the denition of uncertainty about the marginal rates
of substitution. For such voters, the marginal rates of substitution between all issues are
constant over the entire range of platforms. Our denition of uncertainty about marginal
rates of substitution still applies, even though, in this case, the set G and therefore also the
set 	(fg;G) are singletons.
The following Theorem states that any two-dimensional game with parties that are un-
certain about the marginal rates of substitution of voters has an equilibrium. Even these
in which parties know the distribution of voter ideal points . As long as there are only
two issues involved, the uncertainty about marginal rates of substitution is sucient for the
existence of equilibria. Of course, following Lemma 1, two-dimensional games of electoral
competition also have equilibria if parties are in addition uncertain about .
Theorem 1. Let (2;X;fg;G) be a game where parties are uncertain about the marginal
rates of substitution. Then (2;X;fg;G) has a political equilibrium.
There is no hope of demonstrating this theorem using Nash's Existence Theorem or any
of its relatives, for the best response correspondences in games of the type (2;X;fg;G) are
generally not convex-valued. We proceed by means of a dierent strategy: we rst show that
there is only one candidate for an equilibrium, and then prove that in our game there does
not exist any preferred deviation for either party from that platform prole.
4.1 Characterization of Political Equilibria
To characterize the set of equilibria of a game of electoral competition (d;X;fg;G), we
need to introduce the notion of the median vector. For any probability distribution ; we
call the vector of the medians of all marginal distributions i, that is, the vector m() :=
(m(1);:::;m(d)), the median vector of : Since  has full support on the convex set
15X, the medians of the marginal distributions and thereby the median vector are uniquely
dened. Throughout this section, we normalize the median vector of  to 0 : m() = 0; and
take the convention that 0 denotes the vector (0;0;:::;0) (the dimension of this vector will
always be clear from the context).
Observe that the median vector can be found as the intersection of n hyperplanes such
that each of them cuts the policy space X into two parts containing exactly half of the
probability mass of  and has one of the n base vectors as its normal vector. These n
hyperplanes always intersect and therefore the median vector always exist. Note that the
generalized median of  is dened as a point such that every hyperplane running through
the generalized median cuts the policy space X into two parts containing exactly half of the
probability mass of . This is a strong requirement; not every distribution has a generalized
median. However, if a distribution  does have a generalized median, it must coincide with
the median vector of the distribution.
Proposition 2. Let (x;y) be an equilibrium of the game (d;X;fg;G); then x = y = 0:
Proof: Suppose that (x;y) 6= (0;0); say y1 6= 0: Let x0 := (0;y2;:::;yd): Facing the choice
between x0 and y; all voters decide on the basis of whether g1(j0   a1j) is smaller or larger
than g1(jy1 a1j): Since 0 is median of 1, at least half of the voters will vote for x0: And since
supp() is convex and since G1 is a nite set of continuous functions, we have  (x0;y) > 1
2
for all   2 	(fg;G): Consequently, min
 2	(fg;G)
 (x0;y) > 1
2: Since x is a best response to
y; in equilibrium Party 1 receives a utility of min
 2	(fg;G)
 (x;y) > 1
2: Therefore, Party 2 only
receives a utility of min
 2	(fg;G)
(1    (x;y)) < 1
2 in equilibrium. But then Party 2 would be
strictly better o by changing its platform to x since min
 2	(fg;G)
(1    (x;x)) = 1
2: 
The intuition behind Proposition 2 is that any party can choose to compete with the
other in only one dimension. The only protection against such \unidimensional attacks" is to
propose the median m(i) = 0 associated with every issue i: Also, observe that the certainty
case is covered by Proposition 2: if G is a singleton, then parties know the distribution of
voter ideal points  as well as the shape of voters' indierence curves G = fgg. Given that
we now know that (0;0) is the only strategy prole that could possibly be an equilibrium, we
can now approach the problem of equilibrium existence as the question when this particular
strategy prole is an equilibrium.
4.2 The Existence of Political Equilibrium
A sucient condition for Theorem 1 to hold is that for any deviation y from the median vector
0, there exists an electorate  y in the set of electorates 	(fg;G); such that  y(y;0) <
161
2: If there is one such electorate, then min
 2	(fg;G)





2: Uncertainty aversion proves a strong force towards both parties announcing the same
platform. The entire uncertainty is eliminated when both parties announce the same platform
since in this case they both receive half the vote under any assumption on the electorate.
The complete proof that such a  y exists can be found in the appendix. Here we give
a sketch of the basic argument. First, we show that, given our assumption that parties are
uncertain about the marginal rates of substitution, for any platform y 2 X there exists some
 y 2 	(fg;G) such that  y(y;0)  (y;0) where  is chosen such that there exist
hi;ki 2 Gi with h0
i(t)  i  k0
i(t) for all t 2 R+ and i = 1;2: So while the shape  itself
might not be contained in G, for any y there exists some electorate   2 	(fg;G) according
to which the vote share of Party 1 is no higher than what it would get if all voters had shape
: In fact, this holds independently of the dimension of the issue space of the game, and we
conclude that whenever (0;0) is an equilibrium of the game (d;X;fg;fg); it is also an
equilibrium of the game (d;X;fg;G) for any d 2 N:
The last step of the proof builds on a fact that was discovered by Rae and Taylor (1971). It
is shown that any game (2;X;fg;fg) has an equilibrium (which, according to Proposition
2, must be the prole (0;0)). It should be noted that the present result is slightly dierent
from Rae and Taylor's (1971) result, as they assumed a nite and odd number of voters. We
provide our own proof of this very similar result for two reasons: rst we consider innite
electorates, secondly, and more importantly, the argument in Rae and Taylor (1971) is awed
insofar as they claim that \the proof of this theorem [the existence of an equilibrium in the
two-dimensional case] for any number of dimensions is immediate." Below (Example 3), we
provide a counterexample to this claim (for the case with a nite and odd electorate, as well
as for the case of a continuum of voters).
Without loss of generality, we only investigate deviations y  0: First, we establish that
for any deviation with y11 6= y22; less than half of the electorate votes for the deviator; in
this case, the partisans of the deviation can either be all found above the median line x2 = 0
or to the right of the median line x1 = 0: (The dashed lines in Figures 3 and 4 show the set
of all indierent voters for dierent deviations y, and dierent shapes . In each case, the
dashed lines separate the set of voters with a strict preference for y from the set of voters
with a strict preference for 0: Note, that in either case, this set is a strict subset of a \half"
of the electorate, as described by the horizontal and vertical lines through 0.)
Insert Figures 3 and 4
Finally, for the case of y11 = y22, the set of voters who prefer y to 0 is a subset of the
positive quadrant, while the set of voters preferring 0 to y is a superset of the negative quad-
rant. The observation that the positive and the negative quadrant of any two-dimensional
17distribution (with median vector 0) must contain an equal amount of probability mass con-
cludes the proof. (The dotted areas in Figure 5 represent the set of indierent voters. It
is important to note that the set of voters strictly preferring the deviation y is a subset of
the upper right quadrant, whereas the set of voters strictly preferring 0 is a superset of the
lower left quadrant.)
Insert Figure 5
So (0;0) is indeed an equilibrium of the game (2;X;fg;G) when parties are uncertain
about the marginal rates of substitution.
Remarks: Observe that we do not use the \common prior" assumption in this proof. The
proof would also hold true if both parties where to hold dierent beliefs on G, as long as each
of the parties fullls the assumption of uncertainty about the marginal rates of substitution
(two dierent 's can be used). The only reason for the assumption of a \common prior" is
that it allows us to reduce on notation. The same holds true for the results in the remainder
of the paper.
Unfortunately, the result that any game (2;X;fg;fg) has an equilibrium does not
extend to higher dimensions. If it did, we could apply the proof of Theorem 1 to games of
any dimension, since the two-dimensionality of the game was used only to establish that any
game (2;X;fg;fg) has an equilibrium. To obtain existence results for higher dimensional
issue spaces, it appears that we need to introduce some uncertainty about the distribution
of ideal points. But before doing so, let us conclude this section by providing an example
of a three-dimensional game that does not have an equilibrium, even though the parties are
uncertain about the marginal rates of substitution. Observe that this example at the same
time shows that the games (d;X;fg;fg) might have no equilibria for d > 2.
Example 3. Consider the game (3;X;fg;fg); with X = [ 1;1]3 and  given by the
following chart, where the left column denotes subspaces of [ 1;1]3 and the right column
the probability mass in those subspaces. We assume that the conditional distribution in any
of the subspaces S is uniform.
18S (S)
[0;1]3 :3
[0;1]2  [ 1;0) :05
[0;1]  [ 1;0)  [0;1] :05
[0;1]  [ 1;0)2 :1
[ 1;0)3 :2
[ 1;0)2  [0;1] :15
[ 1;0)  [0;1]  [ 1;0) :15
elsewhere 0
Assume that 1 = 2 = 3 = 1
3, that is, assume that voters care equally much about all
three issues. Observe that the median vector is at the origin, m() = 0, and therefore, by




preferred deviation from this platform prole as nearly all voters with ideal points in [ 1;0)3,
[ 1;0)2  [0;1], [ 1;0)  [0;1]  [ 1;0) and [0;1]  [ 1;0)2 will vote for the deviator, and
these sets make up 60% of the electorate. All voters in these quadrants that are suciently
far away from the origin prefer (  1
1000;  1
1000;  1
1000); as this platform is closer to their ideal
point with respect to at least two dimensions. Since there are only very few voters in the
immediate proximity of (  1
1000;  1
1000;  1
1000) and 0, this argument concerns nearly 60% of
the electorate.10
5 Uncertainty about Electorates
In this section, we consider the case that parties are uncertain about the distribution of ideal
points , as well as about the marginal rates of substitution. This will not only add more
realism to the model, but it will also allow us to extend our prior two-dimensional existence
result (Theorem 1) to higher dimensions. In particular, the main result of this section is that
if the two uncertainty-averse parties do not know whether the electorate leans left or right
(in a sense to be dened precisely below), and if they are also uncertain about the marginal
rates of substitution, then political equilibria exist in voting games with three-dimensional
issue spaces.
10The original result by Rae and Taylor (1971) only concerns nite and odd electorates. Consider the
following variation of the above example as a counterexample to their claim: let the issues space and  be
as in Example 3, but let there be 21 voters, whose ideal points are distributed as follows. 6 at (1;1;1), 1
at (0;0;0), (1;1; 1) and (1; 1;1) each, 2 at (1; 1; 1), 4 at ( 1; 1; 1) and 3 each at ( 1; 1;1) and




prole (0;0) yields an absolute majority of voters (12) for the deviating party.
195.1 Characterization of equilibria
Median vectors will again play an important role in the characterization of equilibria. In
the present case, however, there is no one median vector, since parties hold multiple priors
on the distribution of voter ideal points. We can characterize the set of possible equilibrium
platform proles as a function of the median vectors of all the electorate that parties take
into account. Given a set  of voter ideal point distributions on Rd, we thus concentrate on






m(k)  xk  max
2
m(k) for all 1  k  d

:
This can be thought of as the set of all platforms in-between the median platforms of the
dierent distributions  in . The counterpart of Proposition 2 in the present context reads
as follows:
Proposition 3: Let (x;y) be an equilibrium of the game (d;X;;G); then x;y 2 M():
Proof: Suppose that y = 2 M(); say y1 < min
2
m(1): Then, by the same argument as
in the proof of Proposition 2, a deviation from x to x0 := (min
2
m(1);y2;:::;yd) yields for
every   2 	(;G) a vote share  (x0;y) > 1
2: Thus min
 2	(;G)
 (x0;y) > 1
2 and as x is a best
response to y; the utility of Party 1, min
 2	(;G)
 (x;y); is larger than 1
2: So, in equilibrium,
Party 2 only obtains a utility of min
 2	(;G)
(1    (x;y)) < 1
2; and hence it would be strictly
better o to change its platform to x as min
 2	(;G)
(1    (x;x)) = 1
2: 
Remarks: (a) In passing, we note that we do not know if in equilibrium both parties
need to announce the same platform. In Bade (2004), I show that if we model uncertainty
aversion in a dierent way following Bewley (2002), equilibria with both parties announcing
dierent platforms should always be expected to arise.
(b) It may be tempting to presume that in any equilibrium both parties must announce
the median vector of some distribution in : It is easy to show that this is not true: Consider
the game (2;X;;fg) where  := f + (1   ) : 0    1g; and assume that supp() =
supp() = [ 1;2]2, ([ 1;1]2) = ([0;2]2) = :999; and that the distribution of  conditional
on [ 1;1]2 as well as the distribution of  conditional on [0;2]2 are uniform. Let us nally




3)) is an equilibrium
of this game, even though m(1) = m(2) holds for all  2 :
(c) The equilibrium platforms depend on the actual preferences of voters only insofar as
beliefs of parties about the electorate are related to the actual preferences of voters. We
20consider this reasonable: the parties are picking the platforms so the outcome of the game
should depend on whatever they know or believe about the electorate. The beliefs of parties
depend on the information they have available; in particular a party cannot adopt a belief
for strategic purposes. If we assume that the parties' information about the locations of
the respective median voters is not too dierent from the information that is available to
researchers, then the present theory can be used to predict equilibrium platforms.
(d) The assumption of common belief sets is not necessary. However, observe that the
belief sets need to be close enough in the sense that in equilibrium both parties must locate
in M(1) as well as in M(2): They can do so if and only if the intersection between these
two sets is not empty. If the intersection is empty, the beliefs of parties diverge so far as to
allow for strategy proles in which each party is sure it will win the election. Billot et al.
(2000) develop a notion of \Sharing Beliefs" that generalizes the idea of common priors to
environments with multiple agents that all have maxmin expected utilities following Gilboa
and Schmeidler (1989). If the criterion mentioned in Billot et. al. (2000) is satised in the
present context, then the intersection of M(1) and M(2) must be non-empty.
5.2 The Existence of Equilibrium
To state sucient conditions for the existence of equilibria, we have to introduce some
more concepts. Given a distribution of , let us agree to call a voter a leftist if her ideal
point lies below the median vector with respect to all issues. That is, a voter with ideal
point a 2 X is a leftist (rightist) i ai < m(i) (ai > m(i); respectively) for all issues




r respectively. A distribution  is called left-leaning (right-leaning)
if (A





l ) respectively). Finally, a distribution  with equally
many leftists and rightists ((A

l ) = (A
r)) is called balanced. Observe that any balanced
distribution is left- and right- leaning at the same time. The condition of balance is much
weaker than the condition that a generalized median exists: while the former imposes one
equality on the distribution, the latter imposes a continuum of equalities, as in this case each
hyperplane through the generalized median must cut the electorate into half spaces with an
equal amount of voter ideal points in them. We say a party is uncertain as to whether
the electorate leans to the left or to the right if there exists a left-leaning and a right-
leaning distribution in the set of party beliefs on the distribution of voter ideal points. Just
as with the denition of uncertainty about the marginal rates of substitution, the present
denition covers one case of certainty. Parties who hold a singleton belief  = fg, which is
balanced, satisfy the denition of uncertainty as to whether the electorate leans left or right.
Theorem 2: Let (3;X;;G) be a game where parties are uncertain about the marginal
21rates of substitution and uncertain as to whether the electorate leans to the left or to the
right. Then (3;X;;G) has a political equilibrium.
Theorem 1 arises as a special case of Theorem 2 due to the following two observations: rst
of all, two-dimensional games are embedded in three-dimensional games (by simply adding
a dummy dimension on which all players have the same ideal point a3 and attitude g3).
Secondly, any two-dimensional distribution is balanced, since in the two-dimensional case
(A

l ) can be calculated as 1 (fa : a1 > m(1)g) (fa : a2 > m(2)g)+(A
r) = (A
r),
where fa : a1 > m(1)g and fa : a2 > m(2)g denote the half spaces to the right of the
median line m(1) and above the median line m(2), respectively. Again in analogy to
Theorem 1, Theorem 2 covers one case in which parties are expected utility maximizers.
According to the theorem, equilibria exist in the knife-edge case of (3;X;fg;) for any
balanced  and any diamond-shaped indierence curves . The proof of Theorem 2 is
reminiscent of the proof of Theorem 1. We showed already that under the assumption that
parties are uncertain about the marginal rates of substitution, there exists an  2 Rd
++ such
that the equilibrium set of (3;X;fg;fg) is a subset of the equilibrium set of (3;X;fg;G)
for any xed : If we can nd a  2  such that (3;X;fg;fg) has an equilibrium, the
proof is complete, since we know that any equilibrium for some game of electoral competition
is also an equilibrium in a game with larger belief sets (Lemma 1). The main diculty lies
in the fact that (3;X;fg;fg) need not have an equilibrium (see Example 3). Yet, in
the appendix we generalize Rae and Taylor (1971) and show that (3;X;fg;fg) has an
equilibrium if and only if  is balanced. Given our assumption that the parties are uncertain
as to whether the electorate is left- or right-leaning we can show that there exists some
balanced  in ; and we thus obtain that (m();m()) is an equilibrium of (3;X;;G):
The following example shows that the conditions given in Theorem 2 are sucient, but
not necessary, for the existence of an equilibrium.
Example 4: Let (3;[ 1;1]3;;G) be a game with  the set of all convex combinations
of the voter ideal point distributions 1;:::;8: Assume that all of these distributions i are
right-leaning. Assume furthermore that, for each of the eight octants around 0, there is
a distribution i amongst 1;:::;8 such that the interior of that octant contains at least
:6 of the probability mass according to i: (Observe that we do not require 0 to be the
median vector of any one of these distributions of voter ideal points.) We claim that 0 is
an equilibrium of that game. Observe that, by our assumption that all voters' preferences
are single-peaked , for any deviation y from 0, there exists some octant such that all voters
in that octant are voting for 0: Now, by our construction of the set  there exists a  in it
such that at least :6 of all voters prefer 0 to y according to that : Consequently, (0;0) is an
22equilibrium, even though by construction all distributions  2  are right-leaning. Observe
also that we did not specify G to obtain this result, G might even be a singleton.
Roughly speaking, Theorem 2 establishes that any three-dimensional game played amongst
parties that are neither certain about the voters' marginal rates of substitution nor about
the leanings of the electorate has an equilibrium. Example 4 shows that this amount of
uncertainty is sucient, but not necessary, for the existence of equilibria. However, from
Proposition 3 we know that in any equilibrium, whether the sucient conditions are fullled
or not, both parties have to announce a policy from the median set. This means that with
respect to every issue i; parties announce the ideal of a voter who is the median voter of the
marginal distribution i of some  2 :
6 Higher-Dimensional Issue Spaces
In the introduction, we argued that empirical studies on the dimensionality of policy spaces
usually nd that very few dimensions suce to explain voting behavior. Consequently, the
extension of the present results to policy spaces with more than three dimensions is mainly
of technical interest. For completeness, we develop a variation of Theorem 3 that applies to
higher-dimensional policy spaces. To this end, we need one further bit of notation.








f describe the \quadrants" around the median vector of a distribution. We
call a distribution  2 P(X) equilibrated, if there is the same amount of probability mass in




 f) for all f 2 f1; 1gd: Note that any
balanced three-dimensional distribution and any two-dimensional distribution is equilibrated.
Also note that the condition is less restrictive as the condition that a generalized median
exists: while for a distribution to be equilibrated less than 2d equations have to whole, the
existence of a generalized median requires a continuum of equations to hold.
Theorem 3: Let d 2 N and let (d;X;;G) be a game such that parties are uncertain
about the marginal rates of substitution and that there exists an equilibrated  in , then
(d;X;;G) has an equilibrium.
In this result, we require that there exists some equilibrated  in , whereas Theorem
2 requires that parties do not know whether the electorate leans to the left or to the right.
Within three-dimensional voting games, these conditions coincide. Consequently, Theorem
3 generalizes Theorem 2 (and thereby Theorem 1) to the context of a d- dimensional issue
23space. The proof of Theorem 3 is analogous to that of Theorem 2. In fact, a crucial step
in the proof of Theorem 2 was to establish the existence of an equilibrated  in  under
the conditions of that theorem. In Theorem 3, we simply impose the existence of such a
distribution as a hypothesis. From then on, both proofs are identical.
The condition that there exists an equilibrated  in  is, admittedly, not very intuitive.
However, it may well be the case that the parties' uncertainty about electorates increases
with the dimensionality of the issue space. Perhaps this uncertainty about the distribution
of ideal points may indeed be large enough that some equilibrated distributions could be
considered a plausible assumption on the voter ideal point distribution by the agenda setters
of the parties. At any rate, Theorem 3 (like Theorem 2) provides only sucient conditions.
Example 4 demonstrates that there remains room for weaker conditions that would ensure
the existence of equilibrium.
7 Conclusion
This paper provides an example for Ordeshook's claim that incorporation of an assumption
that \candidates are uncertain about voters' exact preferences" can mitigate problems of
equilibrium non-existence in games of electoral competition. Given that parties are su-
ciently uncertain, equilibria exist in two-party games of electoral competition when multiple
issues are at stake. To be precise, it was shown that any game of electoral competition with
a policy space of at most three dimensions has an equilibrium if parties are uncertain about
the marginal rates of substitution of voters and whether the electorate leans left or right.
What is more, in these equilibria both parties announce issue by issue the policy preferred
by the \median voter" that is relevant for the issue under consideration. So this theory can
be used to justify the common practice to look at separate issues when modeling democratic
processes.
It has to be said that the proofs in the paper rely on the assumption that the sets of
party beliefs contain some belief according to which an equilibrium exists. Since according
to these beliefs the games would also have equilibria if parties were not uncertainty-averse,
one might ask: why introduce uncertainty aversion, when one could also obtain equilibrium
existence by positing that parties hold exactly such beliefs about the electorate? The reason
is that the assumption that parties would hold precisely the belief according to which an
equilibrium exists seems overly strong. Why would parties believe that the indierence
curves of voters are diamond shaped and that there are exactly as many leftists and rightists
in the electorate? Conversely, the assumption that this is just one of the many beliefs that
parties entertain seems much less demanding. The upshot of uncertainty aversion is that
we do not need to impose some knife-edge condition on party beliefs to obtain equilibrium;
24instead, it is sucient to establish that parties consider the cases in which an electorate
leans left or right and that parties are uncertain about the marginal rates of substitution to
obtain equilibria.
The conditions for the existence of equilibrium given in the theorems of this paper are
sucient, but not necessary. It is hoped that in the future some weaker conditions for the
existence of equilibria will be established. A promising venue could be to assume Euclidean
preferences and to restrict the set of permissible voter ideal point distributions and then ask
what amount of uncertainty is sucient to establish that equilibria exist. In particular, we
hope to show that under the assumption that the society is not polarized (following Caplin
and Nalebu (1988)), a small amount of uncertainty on the voter ideal point distribution is
sucient to establish the existence of equilibria in d dimensional games.
Another extension of this research could be to apply the same model of uncertainty
aversion to solve dierent but related non-existence problems in political economy. Some
models of ideologically motivated parties, for example, are plagued by similar non-existence
problems as the Downs model. A main challenge in extending the present framework to
such models lies in dening the utilities of parties. Electoral competition with more than 2
parties could be another area of application. Platform-positioning models with more than
two parties generally lack equilibria. Uncertainty aversion could be one of the modelling
approaches to trim the model's incentives to deviate down to a more realistic lower level.
Furthermore, in a companion paper (Bade 2004), we show that with a dierent approach
towards modelling uncertainty-averse actors (following Bewley 2002), there might be equi-
libria in which oce-motivated parties announce dierent platforms. Our explanation for
platform divergence does not need any ad hoc assumptions on the ideological motivation or
parties; the driving force of this result are non-convexities in the preferences of voters.
8 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1: We will need the following intermediate result.
Dene  0 : B(X  H) ! [0;1] by  0(A) :=
R
P(XH)  (A)p(d ), for an arbitrarily xed
p 2 P. This is well-dened as   7!  (A) is a Borel-measurable function, which can be shown
using Theorem 14.13 in Aliprantis and Border (1999), letting f = 1A. Moreover, it is obvious
that  0(?) = 0 and  0(X  H) = 1: To conclude that  0 is a Borel probability measure on




















25by the monotone convergence theorem. Since it is also easy to show that   is non-atomic
and  a has full support, it follows that 	  P(X  H):Moreover, for any p;q 2 P and any




 p(d ) + (1   )
Z
P(XH)
 q(d ) =
Z
P(XH)
  (p + (1   )q)(d );



















0 (I(x;y)) =  0(x;y):
This completes the proof of Proposition 1. 
Proof of Theorem 1:
Lemma 2 (Rae and Taylor, 1971): Any game of the form (2;X;fg;fg) has an equi-
librium.
Proof: Suppose some protable deviation y  0 existed (remember that we normalized
m() = 0). Let A be the set of voters that are indierent between 0 and y: Given that every
voter has the same shape  we have that all voters a0 = 2 A for which there exists an a 2 A
such that a0  a strictly prefer 0 to y: If A\faja1 = 0g = ? or A\faja2 = 0g = ? then since
the A is a connected set either all voters in faja1  0g or all voters in faja2  0g will prefer
0 to y: Figures 1 and 2 give two examples for these two cases; the dashed lines represent the
set A; observe that in either there is one axis that does not intersect with the dashed lines.
Since (0;0) is the median vector, we have (faja1  0g)  1
2 and (faja2  0g)  1
2, so in
either case at least half the electorate votes for 0 and therefore such a deviation to y cannot
raise the deviating party's vote share.
Let us now consider the remaining case in which A \ faja1 = 0g 6= ? and A \ faja2 =
0g 6= ?: This only holds for deviations y such that y11 = y22. In this case, all voters in
faja1  0 and a2  y2g and in faja1  y1 and a2  0g are indierent between 0 and y.
Since we assume that all indierent voters vote for either platform with equal probability,
we only need to look at the voters that strictly prefer one platform to the other. The set of
voters strictly preferring y to 0 is a subset of faja1 > 0;a2 > 0g, whereas the set of voters
strictly prefer 0 to y is a superset of faja1 < 0;a2 < 0g: But since (0;0) is the median vector
of the non-atomic  we have (faja1 > 0;a2 > 0g) = (faja1 < 0;a2 < 0g): Consequently,
26it cannot be that such a deviation increases the vote share. But by the same arguments
no other deviation y raises the vote share to the deviating party and (0;0) is a political
equilibrium. .
Lemma 3: Let d 2 N, and let (d;X;fg;G) be a game in which parties are uncertain
about the marginal rates of substitution. Then, for all y 2 X, there exists an electorate  y
in 	(fg;G) such that  y(y;0)  (y;0).
Proof: Fix an arbitrary y 2 X: Since parties are uncertain about the marginal rates
of substitution, there exists an  2 Rd
++ such that in all Gi there are some dierentiable
functions hi and ki with h0
i  i  k0
i: Dene the map a 7 ! (ga
1;:::;ga





hi; if jyi   aij  jaij
ki; otherwise
; i = 1;:::;d:
We begin by showing that u(0;a) > u(y;a) implies uga(0;a) > uga(y;a) for all a: Observe,
rst of all, that u(0;a) > u(y;a) implies
X
i2H
i(jyi   aij   jaij) >
X
i= 2H
i(jaij   jyi   aij);
where H := fi 2 f1;:::;dgj jyi   aij  jaijg:Then, since h0
i  i  k0
i,
(
hi(jyi   aij)   hi(jaij)  ijyi   aij   ijaij; if jyi   aij  jaij
ijaij   ijyi   aij  ki(jaij)   ki(jyi   aij); otherwise.





i (jyi   aij)   g
a
i (jaij)) > 0;
that is, uga(0;a) > uga(y;a): One can show similarly that u(0;a) = u(y;a) implies
uga(0;a)  uga(y;a) for all a:
Next, dene an electorate  y such that on the one hand the conditional distribution of
shapes given a voter ideal point a can be described by the map a 7! ga; that is, we assume
that  (gaja) = 1 for all a and that, on the other hand, the voter ideal point distribution  a
equals : Since the map a 7! ga is measurable,  y is well-dened. Moreover, by construction,
27we have that  y 2 	(fg;G). The construction of the map a 7 ! ga also implies:














































and the proof is complete. 
Proof of Theorem 1: By Proposition 1, we know that the only candidate for an
equilibrium is (0;0): The payo to a party that deviates to y is min
 2	(fg;G)
 (y;0): By Lemma
3, (y;0) is an upper bound on this payo. Finally, by Lemma 2, according to the
electorate    no protable deviation form (0;0) exists: Thus,
min
 2	(fg;G)






where  y is the electorate constructed in Lemma 3. So there is no protable deviation for
either party, and (0;0) is an equilibrium of (2;X;fg;G). 
The following Lemma 4 is a major building block of the proof of Theorem 2.
Lemma 4: A game of the form (3;X;fg;fg) has an equilibrium if and only if  is
balanced.
Proof: We dene the function sgn: R3 ! f1;0; 1g3 by sgn(x) = (sgn(x1);sgn(x2);sgn(xd));
and let A

f := fxjsgn(x   m()) = fg for all f 2 f1; 1g3: As Lemma 4 covers games with
certainty, we can, for ease of exposition, revert to the normalization m() = 0: We therefore
also drop  from the notation of these sets and now write Al; Ar and Af:
We rst show that (Al) = (Ar) if and only if (Af) = (A f) for all f; then we show
that this condition is necessary and sucient for (0;0) being an equilibrium.
Let (Al) = (Ar): Dene 4 variables Df := (Af)   (A f) for all f with f1 = 1:
Since 0 is the median vector of  we have that
fi=1
Df = 0 for all i = 1;2;3: Given D(1;1;1) =
(Ar) (Al) = 0 this reduces to a system of 3 linearly independent equations in 3 unknowns,
the only solution is Df = (Af)   (A f) = 0 for all f:
Given (Af) = (A f) for all f we show that for any deviation from (0;0) the party
remaining at 0 gets at least half the vote share. First, we derive a condition under which
28all voters in some Af vote for 0. Then we use this condition to show that given the choice
between the platforms y 6= 0 and 0, for any f, either all voters in Af or all voters in A f
vote for 0 or no voter in either Af or A f strictly prefers y to 0:
All voters in Af vote for 0 if for all a 2 Af the utility from platform 0 :  
P3
i=1 ijaij
is larger than the utility from the other platform:  
P3
i=1 ijyi   aij. So all voters in Af









































So if this expression is negative the proof is complete as all voters in Af vote for 0: If







  fiiyi < 0
and therefore all voters in A f vote for 0: Finally, if
d P
i=1






















and consequently no voter in either Af or A f strictly prefers platform y.
Given that (A f) = (Af) for all f we can now show that
P
f1=1
(Af) represents a lower
bound on (0;y): This is so since, on the one hand, for any f with f1 = 1 and any deviation
y either all voters with ideal point in Af or all voters with ideal point in A f or one half of
the voters with ideal point in Af [A f vote for 0; and, on the other hand, (A f) = (Af)





have (0;y)  1
2 and therefore no deviation from (0;0) that raises the vote share of the
deviating party exists.
Now suppose  were not balanced, that is, assume (Al) = p and (Ar) = q with p > q:






2   s   r   q
( 1; 1; 1) p
( 1; 1;1) s + (q   p)
( 1;1; 1) r + (q   p)
( 1;1;1) 1
2   s   r   q   (q   p)
When a deviator plays ( 1
1; 1
2; 1
3) with  > 0 against 0, then all voters in Al;A(1; 1; 1);A( 1; 1;1)
and A( 1;1; 1) are voting for 0: In the limit for  ! 0 only these voters will vote for 0: So
in the limit the vote share of the remaining party is 1
2 + q   p. Since the vote share of





2 and (0;0) cannot be an equilibrium. 
Before proceeding with the proof of Theorem 2, let us remark that Lemma 4 generalizes
Lemma 3 as any two-dimensional distribution of voter ideal points is balanced. Secondly,
observe that balance of  does not imply (Af) = (A f) for all f; for higher-dimensional
issue spaces.
Proof of Theorem 2: We start by showing that there exists a balanced  in : By
our assumption that the parties are uncertain as to whether the electorate leans to the left
or right, there exists a left-leaning l and a right-leaning r in : For all  2 [0;1] dene
 = l + (1   )r: Dene
f : [0;1] ! [ 1;1]
f() = (A

l )   (A

r )
a continuous function. Clearly: f(1) > 0 and f(0) < 0 so there exists some b 2 (0;1) such
that f(b) = 0: Observe that b is balanced. Since  convex, we also have that b 2 :
By the same argument as forwarded in the proof of Theorem 1, we know that (m(b);m(b))
is an equilibrium of (3;X;fbg;G): We can conclude by Lemma 1 that it is also an equilib-
rium of (3;X;;G): 
Proof of Theorem 3: Following the proof of Theorem 2, observe that once we had
established that (Af) = (A f) for all f in Lemma 3, we made no more use of either
balance or three-dimensionality in the proofs of Lemma 3. So we note the following Lemma
5 in passing:
30Lemma 5: Take an d-dimensional game (d;X;fg;fg) with m() = 0: This game has
an equilibrium if (Af) = (A f) for all f .
The proof of Theorem 3 proceeds like that of Theorem 2, replacing Lemma 4 by Lemma
5. 
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